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INTRODUCTION 
Political theory has not always been a self-confident 
discipline. In 1961, Isaiah Berlin, the Chichele Professor of Social 
and Political Theory at Oxford, wondered whether it continued to 
exist. His answer was irresolute. Berlin thought that political 
theory’s existence was assured because it poses normative 
questions that are unanswerable by empirical political science.4 
Certain questions elude resolution by empirical observation—
e.g., How should scarce goods be distributed? Why should persons 
comply with law? What actions may a state permissibly coerce? 
Ironically, such normative questions also seem to have eluded 
Berlin. Instead of positing and defending a coherent set of 
answers to these questions, Berlin’s approach to political theory 
was far more circumspect, concerned foremost to recite the 
history of answers supplied by the mighty dead, whom he chided 
for ignoring either the irreducible plurality of value or the 
mischievous tendency of “positive” liberty. 
Then came John Rawls. After the publication of A Theory of 
Justice in 1971, Rawls’s critic and colleague Robert Nozick wrote, 
“Political philosophers now must either work within Rawls’s 
theory or explain why not.”5 Most have chosen to work within or 
against Rawls’s framework, using tools supplied by analytic 
 
 1. University Professor, New York University. 
 2. D.Phil. (Oxon.), J.D. (Harvard), Law clerk to Hon. James O. Browning, United 
States District Court for the District of New Mexico. 
 3. Regents Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, Georgia State University. 
 4. Isaiah Berlin, Does Political Theory Still Exist?, in CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES 
143–172 (Henry Hardy ed., 1979). 
 5. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 183 (1974). 
FARRIS & EDMUNDSON_DRAFT 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/17 7:05 AM 
494 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 32:493 
 
philosophy. The lion’s share of the work has been focused on 
clarifying the meaning and requirements of justice and explaining 
the relationship of justice to other normative concepts. 
Representative of this tradition is G.A. Cohen, late Quain 
Professor at University College London and previously Chichele 
Professor at Oxford. Cohen began his Oxford graduate seminar 
on contemporary political philosophy by teaching that the subject, 
properly understood, concerned three distinct questions: What 
are the correct principles of justice? What should the state do? 
And which social states of affairs ought to be brought about?6 
Today, those normative questions delineate much of the 
discipline of political theory. But compare those questions with 
this one: Are there decisive reasons for or against a 
supermajoritarian cloture rule in the upper chamber of a 
legislative assembly? Like Cohen’s triptych of questions, the 
“filibuster question” is neither empirical nor legal, but 
straightforwardly normative. As such, the inquiry about the 
filibuster rule falls somewhere within the discipline-organizing 
question about what the state should do. Yet, having begun at 
Cohen’s high level of generality, it is unclear how, or even if, the 
specific “filibuster question” will be addressed. This is because the 
general question––What should the state do?––leads naturally to 
subsequent inquiry about which goals states should pursue and 
what states must not do in their pursuit. From that point of 
departure, a political theorist likely proceeds to further discussion 
of the justification of those goals that the state should promote 
and the foundation of the rights that constrain state action. 
Political theory never gets to questions about cloture rules; unless, 
of course, it begins there. 
And that is just what Jeremy Waldron has in mind. With the 
publication of Political Political Theory, the latest (though, not 
current) holder of Oxford’s Chichele Professorship, now 
University Professor at New York University Law School, hopes 
to “encourage young political theorists to understand that there is 
life beyond Rawls” (p. ix). Although one may doubt whether the 
refocusing that Waldron has in mind really is to be found “beyond 
Rawls”—for Rawls was also deeply focused on the justification of 
democratic institutions—Waldron’s meaning is clear: For those 
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working in political theory, he says, there is life “beyond the 
abstract understanding of liberty, justice, and egalitarianism. . .” 
(p. ix). Instead of attempting to elucidate the meaning of our 
largest normative concepts, instead of testing the soundness of 
hypothesized normative principles against all manner of 
counterfactual thought experiments, political theory should focus 
on the evaluation of the rules and structure of state institutions. 
I. THE REORIENTATION OF POLITICAL THEORY 
With the exception of three chapters, the book collects part 
of Waldron’s already-published work on law and political theory. 
Together, the individual pieces amount to a program to reorient 
the focus of political theory toward constitutional law and 
institutional design. For Waldron, political theory ought to be 
more concerned, in the first instance, with the design and 
justification of the institutions that comprise constitutional, 
democratic republics. This is what he means by calling for a return 
to political political theory. Three chapters, the first and the two 
last, frame Waldron’s project—viz., Chapter 1, “Political Political 
Theory” (pp. 1-22), Chapter 12, “Isaiah Berlin’s Neglect of 
Enlightenment Constitutionalism” (pp. 274-289), and Chapter 13, 
“The Constitutional Politics of Hannah Arendt,” (pp. 290-307). It 
is in these chapters that Waldron most clearly issues his call to 
refocus the task of political theory. There, he most clearly 
provides the reasons demanding a reorientation. 
In a way, Waldron’s call for reform seems to issue from the 
oak-paneled Senior Common Room. No one would seriously 
dispute that the United Kingdom is undergoing a period of 
constitutional change and institutional upheaval. Only a few 
reminders are needed: Brexit, the potential secession of Scotland 
or Northern Ireland, the establishment of the UK Supreme Court, 
the reform of the House of Lords, and the Fixed Term Parliament 
Act. There is a concern that the present curriculum of the “Theory 
of Politics” course, which is compulsory for Oxford’s flagship 
Philosophy, Politics, and Economics degree, is not endowing its 
graduates with a better-than-par understanding of the normative 
issues involved in the United Kingdom’s institutional 
transformation. Waldron suggests that the academies in the 
United States may be more attuned to institutional questions, 
given the acute public sensitivity to the countermajoritarian 
aspect of judicial review (p. 18). One would like to hope so; 
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however, we cannot help but wonder if American law students, 
much less undergraduates majoring in public policy or political 
science, are comparatively better prepared than their Oxonian 
counterparts to analyze analogous American institutional 
questions concerning, for example, the basis of reapportionment, 
the institutional actors responsible for redistricting, or the growth 
of executive power and the possible limits thereto. Perhaps 
American law students were at a comparative advantage during 
the days when the legal process school informed the curriculum, 
but those days have passed. 
Waldron’s project to reorient political theory toward 
questions of the value and design of institutions is not only 
motivated by the pedagogical concern that students of politics 
should be able to think through the institutional challenges that 
they will inherit. His call for reorientation seems to be motivated 
by a much darker concern—specifically, the threat posed to 
constitutional democracies by the concentration of executive 
power. We, the inheritors of “Enlightenment constitutionalism,” 
should deeply understand how our institutions legitimate and 
channel the exercise of state power, lest we sign such power over 
to an executive who neither apprehends the values of 
constitutionalism, nor cares. 
Hinting at this greatest concern, Waldron refers, both in the 
first and the last chapter, to Christian Meier’s biography of Julius 
Caesar.7 The reference illuminates what Waldron perceives ought 
to be political theory’s animating fear. In the book, Waldron 
quotes Meier twice for the particular threat that Caesar 
represents: 
Caesar was insensitive to political institutions and the complex 
ways in which they operate …. He could see them only as 
instruments in the interplay of forces. His cold gaze passed 
through everything that Roman society still believed in, lived 
by, valued and defended. He had no feeling for the power of 
institutions … but only what he found useful or troublesome 
about them.… In Caesar’s eyes no one existed but himself and 
his opponents.… The scene was cleared of any suprapersonal 
elements (pp. 14-15, 306). 
The reader is to take the lesson that, from a certain 
viewpoint, those institutions that structure and limit state power 
 
 7. CHRISTIAN MEIER, CAESAR 358–59 (David McLintock trans., Basic Books 1995) 
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may be de-reified—that is, seen through, as really nothing more 
than the individuals who comprise them and, thus, as nothing 
more than sets of friends or enemies. Once the institutions that 
separate and protect individuals from concentrated executive 
power are bathed away, warns Waldron, what remains is politics 
at its most unmediated and perilous. Once institutional bulwarks 
are discredited and are seen to be nothing more than “parchment 
barriers” after all, only unmediated power remains. 
Such unmediated power can manifest in different forms. For 
instance, it can be highly concentrated in the executive branch. 
Waldron succinctly characterizes the view of the executive who, 
like Caesar, successfully devalues, discredits, and even “sees 
through” the institutions that previously existed to constrain his 
or her power: “Now there is just you, and me, and the issue of my 
greatness” (p. 15). 
By contrast, the unmediated power that threatens 
constitutional institutions may also be highly diffuse. The political 
action characteristic of mass movements that express impatience 
with and suspicion of representation, political parties, and 
parliamentary procedure, is no less pathological for being diffuse. 
Waldron offers a formulation that captures exactly what is so 
terrifying about mob rule when the de-reification and 
disappearance of constitutional structures is complete: “Now 
there is just you and me and our interest in justice” (p. 15). 
For Waldron, either way, the emergence of unmediated 
power heralds the end of both constitutional government and the 
preconditions for deliberative democracy. Whether shaped by a 
Caesar or by a Jacobin mass, the de-institutionalized landscape 
lies worlds away from the green and pleasant fields of 
constitutional democracy. Waldron’s implication for the activity 
of political theory is unmistakable: because the raison d’être of 
modern, constitutional republics is to prevent exactly the 
emergence of such unmediated power, so too should it be the 
organizing concern of academic political theory. 
Waldron claims that the channeling, and thus the avoidance, 
of unmediated power was the also the organizing project of 
Enlightenment constitutionalism—“one of the most important 
achievements of the eighteenth century Enlightenment” (p. 274). 
Under the banner of “Enlightenment constitutionalism” we may 
group a core set of interrelated, institutional ideas that, although 
having previously emerged, became clear in the late eighteenth 
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century. In abbreviated statement, they are: (1) the premise that 
sovereignty, i.e., the ultimate authority to make and enforce law, 
inheres in the People itself (or themselves); (2) the notion that a 
constitution is fundamental law—distinct in both prestige and 
pedigree from ordinary legislation—and that such fundamental 
law grants and limits the powers of government; (3) the idea that 
the powers of government are susceptible to both definition and 
separation and, accordingly, may be located in different branches; 
(4) the commitment to the idea of actual, not virtual, 
representation of the People by government, such that 
governmental actors may be understood to be agents of specific 
groupings of the People and subject to their direction and recall; 
(5) the conviction that the People have rights against some types 
of governmental interference and that those rights are enshrined 
in fundamental law; and (6) the empowerment of the judiciary to 
review the actions of other branches of government for 
conformity with the powers both granted and limited by the 
fundamental law.8 
Waldron identifies the main current of the history of political 
theory as the genealogy of exactly this set of ideas, whose canon 
he bookends with Locke’s Two Treatises of Government (1680) 
and the constitutional sections of Kant’s Rechtslehre (1797). 
Belonging to the canon, Waldron includes the writings of 
Madison, Sieyès, Voltaire, Diderot, Paine, Jefferson, Condorcet, 
Hamilton, Montesquieu, and Rousseau (p. 276). What these 
disparate members of the Enlightenment pantheon shared, first 
and foremost, was a predominant interest in the institutions of 
government and how those institutions channel political power to 
preclude tyranny. Their shared project concerning the makings of 
constitutional theory is the most significant tradition of political 
thought in the Enlightenment or since. Thus, Political Political 
Theory not only contains a call for reorientation in the objects of 
theory, but also suggests that the way the history of political 
thought is conceptualized and taught is also due for realignment. 
And so, it is Isaiah Berlin—the much celebrated historian of 
ideas—who is the object of special criticism for neglecting 
Enlightenment constitutionalism in his ambitious but desultory 
writings. After “ransacking” this oeuvre, Waldron concludes that 
 
 8. See generally Gordon Wood, The Origins of American Constitutionalism, in THE 
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Berlin, at best, was just not interested in questions about 
institutional structure. Furthermore, Waldron holds Berlin 
responsible in part for the neglect of institutional concerns in 
political theory as it is conducted and taught in the United 
Kingdom. That might be unfair, and it likely overemphasizes the 
contribution of a single academician, even Berlin. In any event, as 
Waldron impishly puts it, “[t]he old man’s reputation can take it” 
(p. 289). 
II. THE ACTIVITY OF POLITICAL POLITICAL THEORY 
How then does political political theory approach questions 
regarding the design of political institutions? From the book’s 
title, empirical political scientists might understand Waldron to be 
offering some appreciation of the importance of empirical and 
quantitative analysis in the study of choices that various polities 
face in the area of institutional design. They would be 
disappointed. The book contains very little in the way of empirical 
or quantitative analysis that might guide inquiry into institutional 
design. Even if it proposes to be political, “political political 
theory” remains theory, through and through. 
Not that the aloofness from empirical work is necessarily 
grounds for objection. Much in political political theory is 
exemplary of what, by now, amounts to “best practices” in 
political theory, as it is conducted in analytically attuned 
philosophy and political science faculties. Waldron’s most often-
used tool is common to (not-especially-political) political 
theory—namely, straightforward conceptual analysis to 
illuminate and parse variations in the meanings of our normative 
concepts. It is just that in political political theory, the lens of 
conceptual analysis is turned toward institutional concepts that 
have received comparatively less attention than the marquee 
concepts of justice and liberty. 
The value of such conceptual analysis is easy to 
underestimate. The illumination and arrangement of institutional 
concepts gives clarity and precision to normative argument about 
institutional design. It also permits us to consider options in the 
design of political institutions that might have remained hidden 
from view, behind some elision or equivocation. For Waldron, this 
is the major lesson of Locke’s dissection of the executive power in 
the Second Treatise—“to disaggregate and analyze the different 
powers traditionally assigned to the Crown, to identify the limits 
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to each one, and to make sure that the Crown does not escape 
these limits by blurring the public’s understanding of its various 
functions” (p. 92 n. 78). Locke’s analysis of the different 
components of the executive power was a necessary step for 
subsequent development in the argument for the separation of 
powers and the accountability and oversight of the executive. 
Throughout the chapters, Waldron deploys the tools of 
conceptual analysis, dissecting the “theoretical anatomy” of our 
political institutions—legislatures especially—in thought-
provoking ways. For example, the chapter entitled 
“Representative Lawmaking” separates the features of legislation 
that make it a distinct form of lawmaking, as compared to the 
lawmaking by judges and executive agencies, treaty, or custom 
(pp. 125-144). Better still, the chapter entitled “Accountability 
and Insolence” which is first published in this collection, offers an 
abbreviated “anatomy lesson” in republicanism (pp. 167–194). 
Republicanism, in its most encompassing definition, is the view 
“that the business conducted by government is the public business 
… rather than the patrimony of any privileged individual or 
family” (p. 175). Waldron cleverly uses the legal concepts of trust 
and agency to analyze variations in republican thought regarding 
the relationship between the government and the People. 
On the one hand, republican government may be structured 
along the lines of a trust, wherein a settlor establishes a legal entity 
for the advantage of a beneficiary and empowers a trustee to act 
for the beneficiary. Although the beneficiary (the People) may 
hold the trustee (the government) accountable in certain ways 
that are formally structured according to the terms of the 
settlement, the beneficiary may not instruct or remove the trustee. 
There may be several lines of accountability in which one office 
of government formally oversees another office to verify that the 
latter is acting for the People’s benefit in accordance with the 
terms of the settlement. The government as trustee, however, is 
not directly responsive to the People: neither may the People 
instruct the government, nor may government officials be directly 
called to account or replaced by popular demand. Waldron 
associates the trust model of republican thought with the structure 
of the Venetian republic where, as he reads the history, the public 
was the beneficiary of the official conduct and the work of the 
officials was scrutinized by the senate for compliance with the rule 
of law and civic virtue (pp. 176-177). 
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On the other hand, a republican government may be better 
explained by the concept of agency, in which an agent (the 
government) acts on behalf of a principal (the People). Under the 
agency model, the principal may call the agent to give an account 
of the agent’s actions taken on behalf of principal, and the 
principal may sanction or replace or terminate the agency 
relationship. The analogy might even extend to include a 
principal’s power to instruct the agent and the agent’s duty to 
keep the principal informed. This agency model of republican 
thought introduces a particularly democratic form of 
accountability, and Waldron points (p. 177), as an example, to 
Madison’s description in Federalist 57 of the comparatively short 
term of electoral office in the House of Representatives: 
[T]he House of Representatives is so constituted as to support 
in the members a habitual recollection of their dependence on 
the people. Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by 
the mode of their elevation can be effaced by the exercise of 
power, they will be compelled to anticipate the moment when 
their power is to cease, when their exercise of it is to be 
reviewed, and when they must descend to the level from which 
they were raised; there forever to remain unless a faithful 
discharge of their trust shall have established their title to a 
renewal of it.9 
The trust and the agency models of the accountability of 
government in republican thought are predicated on very 
different premises about the relationship of a people and a state 
that governs them. Under the agency model, the state belongs to 
the People; it is not just set up for their benefit. Therefore, the 
agency conception of republicanism entails the need to establish 
democratic structures by which the People themselves can 
actively demand an account of, if not instruct, their agents in 
government because the government acts for them and in their 
name. The trust model, by contrast, does not begin with a premise 
of popular sovereignty. Nor does it necessarily entail democratic 
procedures. 
Waldron’s use of the legal concepts of trust and agency as 
analogies for thinking about the state is not novel (and the book 
makes no reference to Maitland), but these analogies shine light 
on conceptual variations of accountability. They also prompt 
questions regarding the accountability of our own institutions. For 
 
 9. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison). 
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example, Waldron invites the reader to ponder whether the 
federal judiciary in the United States is better described in terms 
of the trust or the agency model of accountability.10 He suggests 
that the exercise of judicial review of legislation is a “mediated 
form of democratic accountability” in which “court procedures 
operat[e] insistently to require legislators and other officials to 
give an account of themselves. . . .” (p. 193). 
If by a “form of democratic accountability” Waldron means 
to refer to an agency-based characterization of the accountability 
of the federal judiciary, this view is doubtful. The relationship 
between the federal judiciary and the People is arguably better 
reflected by the trust analogy. Judicial review of legislation for 
conformance with both the powers and the individual rights 
conferred by the Constitution appears more akin to the internal 
oversight of trustees who ensure that some directors act in 
conformance with the settlement and for the beneficiary’s 
interest. Federal judges are not subject to popular instruction or 
to recall by popular will. Nor is it obvious that judges are, in any 
significant sense, representatives. Moreover, at least some federal 
judges on the highest bench have denied it. For example, when 
interpreting the ordinary meaning of “elected representatives” in 
a federal statute to exclude judges, the late Justice Scalia, joined 
by two other Justices, flatly said that “judges are not 
representatives.”11 This pronouncement, at least with respect to 
federal judges, might easily command agreement: The People 
cannot easily call federal judges to account for their exercise of 
the power of judicial review, even through their representative 
agents in Congress. Nor can the People replace them or easily 
terminate their tenure. However, the defensibility of Scalia’s view 
with respect to state judges who are subject to periodic partisan 
or recall elections (or both) is more complicated. The 
accountability of democratically controllable state judges may 
tend more toward the agency-based model. 
In addition to conceptual dissection, which Waldron does 
deftly and innovatively, another common movement in normal 
political theory is to stake out a set of normative principles and 
 
 10. The question is latent in The Federalist No. 78, in which Hamilton writes that it is 
“rational to suppose … that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between 
the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the 
limits assigned to their authority.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 11. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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then evaluate some state of affairs by reference to those 
normative principles. Often in political theory this move involves 
the evaluation of some distribution of benefits and burdens under 
some principle of distributive justice. Surveying Waldron’s 
disparate book chapters, this movement also occurs in political 
political theory, but there the normative principles staked out are 
geared to evaluate some aspect of institutional design. 
So, for example, in “Principles of Legislation,” Waldron 
maps out seven principles by which we may evaluate the 
legitimacy of legislation (pp. 149-150). By legitimacy, we mean 
that the law admits of a justification for compliance that might 
reasonably be demanded by those persons whose preferences or 
moral views were not enacted. As Waldron notes, the concept of 
legitimacy has a “more focused aspect … to reconcile the losing 
party in particular to the decision that has been made” (p. 255). A 
lawmaking procedure increases in legitimacy—that is, it produces 
laws that better satisfy the demand for a justification of 
coercion—to the extent it satisfies such “principles of legislation.” 
Under these principles, a law is more legitimate to the extent that 
it is (1) made explicitly (2) by representatives, who (3) take due 
care, (4) deliberate, (5) respect disagreement and (6) respect 
formality in decision-making, and is the outcome of (7) majority 
decision. Waldron posits this non-exhaustive set of values as 
especially appropriate to evaluate whether a particular 
procedural rule increases or decreases the legitimacy of laws that 
are the outcome of legislative procedures the rule, in part, 
comprises. 
Now, these individual principles can point in different 
directions with respect to how a particular procedural rule 
contributes to, or detracts from, the legitimacy of law.  To 
complicate matters further, a rule’s satisfaction of one principle 
may depend on the satisfaction of other principles. Consider the 
above-mentioned Senate filibuster rule, Senate Rule XXII, and 
the evaluation of that rule under Waldron’s “principles of 
legislation.” A supermajoritarian cloture rule in effect requires a 
supermajority vote for the passage of legislation, thus failing to 
satisfy the majoritarianism principle and, consequently, 
detracting from the legitimacy of the procedure of which it forms 
a part. Yet, in so doing, the same supermajoritarian cloture rule 
might also render a law-making procedure more deliberative and 
more respectful of disagreement, and thus might add to the 
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legitimacy of the laws it works to produce. But these legitimacy-
conferring benefits of a supermajoritarian cloture rule depend on 
how the rule is invoked and received by the legislators on all sides 
of legislative debate. Hence, the legislators’ respect for the 
formality of the procedural rules and the legislators’ satisfaction 
of their duty to take care also inform whether a supermajoritarian 
cloture rule adds to or detracts from the legitimacy of law. 
This abbreviated evaluation of the filibuster rule is offered as 
an example to suggest that the full normative analysis of 
procedural rules might become quite complicated. The 
satisfaction of “principles of legislation” by any given procedural 
rule will likely be interdependent, polycentric, and fact-sensitive. 
In the chapter devoted to “principles of legislation,” Waldron 
does not investigate the legitimacy of any particular procedural 
rule in light of the particular principles he stakes out. Rather, he 
offers a way of evaluating “the rulebook” in a light that is distinct 
from an analysis about the outcomes of the legislative 
procedure—statutes and their effects on the distribution of 
benefits and burdens. In so doing, Waldron anticipates the shape 
of normative arguments about choices we encounter in the design 
of a law-making institutions. After all, Political Political Theory is 
meant to be a paradigm-introducing work, not a commentary on, 
say, Riddick’s Senate Procedure.12 
III. POLITICAL POLITICAL THEORY AND  
NON-IDEAL THEORY 
Like the empirical political scientists who may be tempted by 
the book’s title, other readers may come to Waldron’s book with 
forgivable yet incorrect assumptions about his project. From its 
calling card, one might suspect that political political theory will 
differentiate itself as offering a non-ideal version of political 
theory. Non-ideal theory seeks to offer normative principles 
about what the state should do, and what the obligations of 
citizens are, given that the current state of affairs is deeply unjust, 
that we can realistically expect that individuals will, at best, only 
partially comply with the demands of justice, and that a just 
distribution of benefits and burdens might not be accessible from 
here. In a sense, non-ideal theory takes people as they are and 
 
 12. FLOYD M. RIDDICK & ALAN S. FRUMIN, RIDDICK’S SENATE PROCEDURE: 
PRECEDENTS AND PRACTICES (Alan S. Furmin ed., 1992). 
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laws as they might be; however, depending on the assumptions 
about people as they are––and particularly that set of people who 
aspire to public office—that Rousseauvian methodological 
premise can result in a political theory that is deeply interested in 
questions of institutional design in order to achieve stability, not 
justice. And the worse one assumes people to be (and, again, 
especially those people who aspire to public office), the greater 
the emphasis on a theory of politics that privileges stability. 
Think, for example, of the premise that Hume advised in 
questions of constitutional design: 
Political writers have established it as a maxim, that, in 
contriving any system of government, and fixing the several 
checks and controls of the constitution, every man ought 
supposed to be a knave, and to have no other end, in all his 
actions, than private interest.13 
The purpose of the person-as-knave design principle serves 
to protect governmental institutions from the ambition of the 
people who inhabit them. Madison also made reference to the 
knavery principle in his argument for the ratification of the 
federal constitution: “Ambition must be made to counteract 
ambition … it may be a reflection on human nature, that such 
devices should be necessary to control the abuses of 
government.”14 
Waldron references Hume and Madison’s non-ideal interest 
in institutional design very early in the book to give a sense of the 
institutionalist turn he believes is required of political theory. But 
unlike the aforementioned passages, Waldron’s argument is not 
that normative theory should be more concerned with questions 
of institutional design because he believes that persons are knaves 
and, therefore, political theory should focus on how institutions 
can embank and direct the currents of their self-interest and 
irrationality. To the contrary, Waldron resists approaches to 
questions of institutional design that begin by taking people as 
they are, in the pejorative sense. To see this in the round, it is 
helpful to recall Waldron’s skepticism of the latest deployment of 
a kind of knavery principle in popular writing about questions of 
institutional design. 
 
 13. David Hume, On the Independence of Parliament, in ESSAYS: MORAL, 
POLITICAL, LITERARY 42 (Eugene F. Miller ed., Liberty Classics 1985) (1742). 
 14. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
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The knavery premise is not limited to great questions of 
constitutional design, posited with the purpose to preserve 
constitutional structures and to achieve stability. Rather, the same 
knavery premise has lately been employed, albeit in a slightly 
modified form, in the design of governmental institutions to 
promote various welfare-related ends. Imagine, then, that people 
are not only knaves, concerned only with their private interest, 
but also that they are not very capable of making decisions that 
best promote their interest. In short, imagine persons are unclever 
knaves. Confronted with a world populated with unclever knaves, 
so-called libertarian paternalists like Cass Sunstein recommend 
that government ought to ensure the design of a choice 
architecture that leverages the unclever knaves’ heuristics, biases, 
and laziness in ways that promote their interest. So, for example, 
because unclever knaves must save something for retirement, the 
government should ensure that employee 401(k) savings plans are 
not only offered, but that both enrollment and a certain 
contribution level are the default position, subject to an opt-out. 
And because unclever knaves must also eat lunch, the lunch staff 
should ensure that the broccoli appears first in the lunch line, 
where one has to request a tray or large cup. In other words, 
“nudging,” a well popularized approach to governmental 
regulation, assumes a form of the eighteenth century 
methodological assumption of person-as-knave. 
Beyond the pages of the book under review, Waldron has 
expressed skepticism of “nudging” exactly because that theory of 
government regulation views persons as little more than unclever 
means toward their own ends, a view that falls far short of how 
government ought to apprehend and to respond to the dignity of 
persons.15 While Political Political Theory begins by adverting to 
Hume’s and Madison’s use of the knavery premise as a ready 
example of thinking about institutional design, Waldron is quick 
to recommend that the design of government institutions should 
be evaluated not only according to how those institutions promote 
interests, but also according to how political institutions respect 
the voice and dignity of citizens. Waldron says, “It is people’s 
capacity for judgment that is at stake when we look for a 
democratic mode of lawmaking and if we are to respect that 
capacity, we must respect the forms, structures, and processes that 
 
 15. Jeremy Waldron, It’s All for Your Own Good, N.Y. REV., Oct. 9, 2014, at 21–23. 
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can house and frame it” (pp. 141-142). This passage amounts to a 
rejection of approaches to the structure of governmental 
institutions that begin from a knavery premise, and it is of a piece 
with Waldron’s suspicion about “nudging.” 
These sidebar comments about Waldron’s reaction to the 
emphasis on “nudging” allows an important insight into the 
paradigm he offers: in an important sense, political political 
theory is not non-ideal at all. Its approach to the design and 
evaluation of political institutions is not premised on human 
failings. Nor does it begin with the recognition of unavoidable 
facts that constrain the achievement of justice. Moreover, political 
political theory is not especially interested in evaluating the 
design of political institutions by reference to their achievement 
of a particular social goal. Political political theory is not, in the 
first instance, interested in welfare-denominated patterns of 
distribution. 
Waldron asks us to understand the value of political 
institutions beyond their instrumental value in promoting some 
independent end. Unlike Hume’s and Madison’s maxim to 
understand institutions as means to control the ambition of the 
participants, and unlike the soft paternalists who, aware of our 
biases and inertia, understand institutions as means to more 
efficiently promote our interests, political political theory 
challenges the theorist to see the worth of institutions beyond 
their ability to promote some independently valuable state of 
affairs. The value of political institutions lies, at bottom, not in the 
distributive outcomes they produce, but rather in their ability to 
enable the ultimate sovereignty of the People by ensuring 
democratic participation and government accountability. In other 
words, it is most important that political institutions are designed 
to achieve legitimacy, even if not justice. 
The focus on the value of political institutions that exists 
apart from the justice of the laws they enact and enforce, is 
connected with political political theory’s motivating concern 
about a Caesarian executive who, neither understanding nor 
caring for the importance of constitutions, is able to “see through” 
institutional entities. Political political theory suggests that 
understanding the value of political institutions primarily by 
reference to their legitimacy makes those institutions more 
concrete, such that they cannot be easily de-reified or suddenly 
made to disappear. And making institutions more concrete—i.e., 
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reifying institutions that are born of parchment—is an imperative 
in view of their proper normative justification, which regards 
them as valuable in ways that are not necessarily connected to 
their outcomes. This is the central thesis of political political 
theory and the single theme that unites Waldron’s disparate 
essays on institutions. 
Concerns about accountability, voice, and dignity are latent 
in relationships not only between political institution and persons, 
but also as between institutions themselves. Waldron introduces 
this point by reference to William Forbath’s Law and the Shaping 
of the American Labor Movement,16 where Forbath reviews the 
history of judicial review of progressive-era labor legislation. 
After labor organizers and sympathetic legislators successfully 
enacted statutes regulating hours and conditions, the courts 
invalidated them as unconstitutional. The frustration of those in 
the labor movement was immense: “I would kill them all and see 
if that would be considered unconstitutional.”17 Waldron’s 
emphasis is not that the exercise of judicial review in this period 
was a setback for the justice of the labor legislation enacted by 
progressives (although he does not deny that); rather, his 
emphasis is on the disrespect of the legislative institutions shown 
by some members of the judiciary. Although the workers had 
grounds to complain of injustice suffered, Waldron suggests that 
an equal, if not deeper, concern is the indignity and disrespect that 
governmental participants in one branch accorded to the work of 
another. There, the legislative institutions—the voices and 
concerns they amplified—were seen as a nullity, were seen 
through, were made to disappear. And that disrespect of a 
representative lawmaking institution should leave an impression 
as deep as the injustice in the distribution of benefits and burdens 
that the laborers were forced to bear. 
IV. A LIFE BEYOND RAWLS? 
For all its emphasis on the design of representative 
institutions to ensure their legitimacy, Political Political Theory 
has surprisingly little to say about the pervasive power, and 
tendency, of money to corrupt institutions and officials and to 
 
 16. WILLIAM FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR 
MOVEMENT 47 (1991). 
 17. Id. 
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erode political legitimacy.18 In these essays, he ignores the 
corrupting influence of money not only in general but also where 
it is obviously pertinent to his specific treatment of alternative 
institutional designs. For example, the choice between unicameral 
and bicameral legislatures is fraught with consequences for the 
economically less-advantaged citizen. A second legislative 
chamber creates an additional “veto point” likely to obstruct—in 
fact, typically intended to obstruct—the will of electoral 
majorities, particularly when that will is directed toward 
redistributive ends. 
The problem of money in politics is not a merely 
valetudinarian concern.  Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz have shown 
that there is a striking correlation between an increasing number 
of veto points in a constitutional structure and an increased 
pattern of economic inequality.19 The greater the number of veto 
points, the more likely that greater private economic resources 
may be converted into unequal opportunities to shape legislation. 
A political theory attentive to questions of institutional design 
should not ignore empirical studies about the myriad ways that 
the hydrologic pressure of money might break through to 
influence the functioning of political institutions. 
Waldron promises “life beyond Rawls,” but the book 
distracts attention from the central and truly hard problem of 
institutionalizing constitutional democracy, the problem that 
Rawls despairingly once called “the curse of money.”20 A 
constitutional democracy will inevitably generate unequal wealth, 
just as it will inevitably engender a plurality of incompatible but 
equally reasonable comprehensive conceptions of the good life. 
As Rawls explained, these circumstances are inherent to the 
operation of a liberal constitutional democracy over time. They 
do not merely derive from the version of the knavery principle 
that Waldron excusably elects to set aside. Moreover, unlike the 
fact of reasonable pluralism, disparately greater amounts of 
 
 18. Granted, Waldron does, in passing, deplore the “conservative strategy of 
appropriating the rule of law as an ideal for something like an IMF/World Bank agenda, 
which sees its aim as that of securing property rights and external investment against 
legislative encroachment” (p. 33). 
 19. See Alfred Stepan & Juan J. Linz, Comparative Perspectives on Inequality and the 
Quality of Democracy in the United States, 9 PERSP. POL. 841, 841–56 (2011); see also 
Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest 
Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. POL. 564, 564–81 (2014). 
 20. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 139 (1999). 
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wealth tend inevitably to impart political advantages. The 
tendency of political institutions necessarily to create the 
conditions for unequal political influence is not a fact that a 
political political theory can ignore. An utter disregard of the 
money problem is Political Political Theory’s most glaring 
omission. Waldron chides “Rawls and his followers” for failing to 
understand that the burdens of judgment apply to “issues of 
justice and social policy” as well as to “religion, ethics, and 
comprehensive conceptions” (p. 94). Set aside the question 
whether this charge is adequately substantiated by what Waldron 
has “written elsewhere” (one of the more common phrases in the 
book); it does not even begin to illuminate why he has chosen to 
ignore the money problem when setting out a political political 
theory. 
Waldron laments that Berlin’s “lack of interest in institutions 
and constitutions has turned out to be contagious.” Yet, Berlin’s 
inattention was not singlehandedly responsible for political 
theory’s excessive focus on the meaning of concepts such as justice 
or liberty, to the exclusion of thinking about institutional design. 
“This,” according to Waldron, “is something that would have 
happened any-way, under the influence of Rawls…” (p. 288, 
emphasis added). This is an astonishing claim. And this passage, 
along with the book as a whole, reflects an almost reckless 
misunderstanding of Rawls. Rawls deliberately chose not to 
bookend “Enlightenment constitutionalism” between Locke and 
Kant. Rawls chose not to, in part, because he read Marx as a 
friendly critic rather than an implacable foe of this very project. 
Just as Berlin had no serious interest in institutions, Waldron 
shows no serious interest in “the curse of money,” not even to 
acknowledge it by expressly setting it aside. Unlike Rawls, 
Waldron, at least in this collection, shows no interest in how 
institutional and constitutional designs might cabin (or “house”) 
the money problem without squelching liberty. 
True, one might plead realism on Waldron’s behalf. The 
United States Supreme Court, in a line of decisions running from 
Buckley v. Valeo21 to McCutcheon v. Federal Election 
Commission,22 has declared that the Constitution forbids 
Congress to legislate with the aim of promoting what Rawls called 
 
 21. 421 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 22. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
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the “fair value of political liberty”—i.e., a roughly equal actual 
(not merely formal) chance of each citizen to affect political 
outcomes.23 But political theory is not constrained by what the 
United States Supreme Court happens to have held; the discipline 
has aspirations about choices in institutional design that go 
beyond the constraints on what may be reasonably advocated for 
in a legal brief. And Waldron does not say that Rawls’s concern 
about fair value, and with the institutional devices that might 
assure it, is utopian or passé. In fact, he does not mention the 
Rawlsian institutionalist concern with fair value at all. This quiet 
insouciance about the problem of reconciling political equality 
and economic inequality gives the collection not merely a 
debating-society flavor, but also an ideological tinge.24 If it is a 
taste of “life beyond Rawls,” one must ask whether it is a way of 
life a political theorist—especially a political political theorist—
ought to be living. 
The “curse of money,” then, is not only a justice problem. It 
is also a legitimacy problem. There is no reason for political 
political theory, which, as Waldron convincingly shows, is a 
fruitful and necessary corrective for contemporary political 
theory, not to address it as such. 
 
 
 23. In an uncharacteristicly overt tone of despondence, Rawls wrote, “Historically 
one of the main defects of constitutional government has been the failure to insure the fair 
value of political liberty. The necessary corrective steps have not been taken, indeed, they 
never seem to have been seriously entertained.” JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
198–99 (rev. ed., Harvard University Press, 1999). It would be tragic, we think, if political 
theory, under the guise of realism, were to internalize this attitude. 
 24. “[P]olitical philosophy is always in danger of being used corruptly as a defense of 
an unjust and unworthy status quo, and thus of being ideological in Marx’s sense. From 
time to time we must ask whether justice as fairness, or any other view, is ideological in 
this way; and if not, why not?” JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 4 
n. 4 (2001). 
